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The Legacy of Griswold
LACKLAND

H. BLOOM, JR.*

The Griswold case, you cannot believe how much time we have spent
on that nutty case, and how much mileage the opponents of Bork
got out of it. This was the key. This must have been the one that
kept them up late. This was the green eyeshade special here. The
Griswold case. A goofy kind of thing.**
Now we go back to the general right of privacy, upon which Roe v.
Wade is based coming out of Griswold, and you had two, one Justice Goldberg out of the ninth amendment and the other one from
Justice Douglas, which is called penumbra, which is sort of a vague
term, but I understand that is something to do with astronomy and
various shadows and unclear things. . . .***
Griswold v. Connecticut' is a landmark case. Indeed, it may be
considered a landmark case for several different reasons. It recognized the existence of a new constitutional right-the right of privacy. Griswold led to an extremely controversial line of cases protecting abortion rights, including Roe v. Wade 2 and Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services.3 It helped to focus the current debate
on the legitimacy of unenumerated fundamental rights jurisprudence
both "on" and "off' the Court. It has become a well-known and widely
accepted civil liberties precedent. Finally, it played a significant role
in the Senate's rejection of the nomination of Judge Robert Bork to
the Supreme Court of the United States.
Even as a landmark case, Griswold is not without its peculiarities. The specific factual and legal issues resolved by Griswold were
not of great practical significance. The Court struck down a Connecticut law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to married couples for purposes of preventing conception (as opposed to disease
prevention). 4 Justice Stewart's apt characterization of the law as

* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University; B.A., Southern
Methodist University, 1970; J.D., University of Michigan, 1973.
** Statement of Senator Alan Simpson in Hearings before the Committee on the
Judiciary of the United States Senate on the Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, September 21, 1987 at

1176.
*** Statement of Senator Howell Heflen, id. September 16, 1987 at 291.
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989).
4. The law, section 53-32 of General Statutes of Connecticut provided, "Any
person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than
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"uncommonly silly" is well remembered.5 There was no indication that
the law ever had been or ever would be enforced against users of
contraceptives (as opposed to distributors). 6 Moreover, Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, decided the case almost as if it involved
an offensive search of the marital bedroom when, of course, it was a
test case brought by a physician at the Yale Medical School and the
head of the Connecticut Planned Parenthood Association. They had
succeeded in getting themselves charged as aiders and abettors by
distributing contraceptives to married couples.' Finally, Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court has developed a reputation in the law
schools as one of the more unusual examples of constitutional analysis8 with its somewhat creative reliance on "penumbras, emanations
and peripheries."9
This article will attempt to explore what the true legacy of
Griswold is after twenty-five years in terms of constitutional theory,
doctrine and public perception.
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
If Griswold is remembered for one thing, it is surely for. having
effectively given birth to the concept of an independent constitutional
right of privacy. At a conceptual level, the right of privacy has fascinated many commentators. Thousands of pages in law reviews have
been devoted to attempting to define the right and explore its
potential coverage. 0 At the very least, then, Griswold has helped to
provide a better life for many law professors and student writers.
sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned." 381 U.S. at 480
(quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (repealed 1958)).

5. 381 U.S. at 527.
6. Id. at 506 (White, J., concurring) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501
(1961)). A birth control clinic had been prosecuted in 1940. Apparently the clinic and
others like it ceased doing business prior to final resolution of the case. See Transcript
of Oral Argument at 15. The case is reported as State v. Nelson, 128 Conn. 412, 11
A.2d 856 (1940). Nelson was apparently brought as a test case. Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 501 (1961).
7. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
8. See, e.g., Kauper, Penumbras, Pereipheries, Emanations, Things Fndamental & Things Forgotten, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235, 242-44, 252-54 (1965) [hereinafter
Kauper]; Dixon, The "New" Substantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A
Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 84 [hereinafter Dixon, Prolegomenon]; Dixon,
The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charterfor an Expanded Law of Privacy?, 64
MICH. L. REV. 197, 205-06, 218 (1965) [hereinafter Dixon, Charter[.
9. 381 U.S. at 384-86. See Greely, A Footnote to "Penumbra" in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 6 CONST. COMM. 251 (1989); Henly, "Penumbra": The Roots of a Legal
Metaphor, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81 (1987) (history of the judicial usage of the
word "penumbra" prior to Griswold).
10. See, e.g., Craven, Personhood: The Right to be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J.
699; Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law,
89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233
(1977); Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage,Kinship and Sexual PrivacyBalancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463 (1983) [hereinafter Hafen]; Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974) [hereinafter Henkin]; Karst, Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980); Lupu,
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However, from a doctrinal standpoint the Court has done remarkably
little with the right of privacy as such. It has decided additional contraception cases under the privacy banner of Griswold." Also, it relied
on the right of privacy as an aspect of the constitutional source for
its abortion decisions from Roe onward. 12 But in neither of these lines
of cases did it do much more than invoke the concept of privacy,
and move on. 13 It has made no meaningful effort to explain what
the concept of privacy consists of beyond noting that it has something to do with certain kinds of important decisions pertaining to
family matters, contraception, child bearing, and education. 4 The Court
has provided neither substance to nor boundaries around the right
of privacy and it has failed to invoke it in some contexts in which it
might have.' 5 Perhaps the notion of a constitutional right to privacy
was misconceived from the very outset. 6 Presumably, there were reasons why the Court, especially Justice Douglas, spoke the language of
privacy.
The legal challenge which ultimately resulted in Griswold v.
Connecticut began some seven years earlier when a married couple
attending the Yale Law School complained to Professor Fowler Harper
about the law banning the use of contraceptives.' 7 Professor Harper
brought a declaratory judgment suit which ended up in the United
States Supreme Court. However, in 1961, in Poe v. Ullman,'8 the Court
dismissed that constitutional challenge for lack of justiciability.' 9 In
Poe, Justice Harlan wrote a very influential dissenting opinion in which

Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981 (1977)
[hereinafter Lupu]; Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court,
1979 Sup. CT. REV. 173 [hereinafter Posner]; Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102
HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989); Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295
(1975); Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court,
62 CORNELL L. REV. 563 (1977); Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary and Intimate Decision, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1447 (1976).
11. See infra notes 191-205 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 68-104 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 71 & 81 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976) (no right of privacy
protection against hairstyle regulation for police officers); Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974) (no privacy right against single family zoning ordinance).
It will be interesting to see whether the right of privacy plays a major role in the
Court's decision in Cruzan v. Missouri Dept of Health, argued December 6, 1989, 58
U.S.L.W. 3395 (Dec. 19, 1989); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973)
(no privacy right to view obscene films in a public theatre). Cruzan raises the question of whether the Constitution permits the state to prohibit a hospital from refusing
to provide nutrition and hydration to a person in a permanent vegatative state. See
Mayo, Constitutionalizing the "Right to Die-", 49 MD. L. REV. (1989) (for the argument that the Supreme Court should not constitutionalize the "right to die").
16. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 9 (1971) [hereinafter Bork, Neutral Principles].
17. Emerson, Fowler Vincent Harper, 74 YALE L.J. 601, 602 (1965).
18. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
19. Id. at 501-09.
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he characterized the due process liberty right that he would have
relied on to invalidate the statute. The Justice attempted to show
that the concept of privacy was protected to some extent by various
constitutional provisions, including the third, fourth and fifth
amendments. 20 Justice Douglas also filed a dissent in Poe in which he
relied on the first amendment as well as a right of privacy developed
as an aspect of substantive due process.2
Following the dismissal of the suit in Poe, the physician-plaintiff
in that case became medical director of a Planned Parenthood center in New Haven.2 The doctor and the executive director of the
clinic were arrested and convicted of violating the Connecticut anticontraceptive law.23 Professor Harper represented them, and their case
24
became known as Griswold v. Connecticut.
In the Jurisdictional Statement he filed in Griswold prior to his
death, Professor Harper set forth the basic right of privacy argument
which Justice Douglas ultimately adopted in his opinion for the
Court. 25 Admitting that the Constitution did not explicitly embody a

right of privacy, he argued that it was nevertheless embodied in the
composite of a variety of amendments including the first, third, fourth,
fifth and ninth, as well as the due process clause of the fourteenth
26
amendment.
In the wake of Professor Harper's death, Professor Thomas
Emerson and Catherine Roraback presented essentially the same privacy argument in their brief for the appellants in Griswold.27 Amicus
Briefs filed on behalf of the appellant by the American Civil Liberties
3°
Union, 28 Planned Parenthood, 29 and the Catholic Council on Liberty
all presented the right of privacy argument, though in somewhat less
detail. The state did not respond to the privacy theory in its brief.31
Most of oral argument was consumed with discussion of the history,
purpose and interpretation of the statute along with the question of

20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 539-55.
Id. at 509, 514, 517-527.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
Id.

24.

381 U.S. 479 (1965).

25. Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant at 13-18, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 64-496).
26. Id.
27. Brief for Appellant at 79-89, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(No. 64-496).
28. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union and Connecticut Civil Liberties Union
as Amicus Curie at 6-9, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 64-496).
29. Brief for the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. as Amicus Curie
at 12-14, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 64-496).
30. Brief for the Catholic Council on Civil Liberties as Amicus Curie at 7-19,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 64-496).
31. See Brief for Appellee, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No.
64-496).
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standing.32 Professor Emerson apologized to the Court because he had
to find an opportunity to explain the privacy thesis in
been unable
33
any detail.
Writing the opinion of the Court, Justice Douglas referred initially
4
to the concept of privacy while quoting from NAACP v. Alabama to
the effect that a "peripheral First Amendment right" of "freedom to
associate and privacy in one's associations" was constitutionally protected.3 5 Unlike Griswold, the concept of privacy invoked in NAACP
pertained to privacy in its more common sense of "confidentiality" or
"secrecy."36 Nevertheless, Justice Douglas was able to use the concept
of, or at least the word, privacy, as a bridge between a precedent in
which a so called peripheral right had been recognized and the instant
case in which he wanted to recognize one. Combining the NAACP
case and a few other right to associate and assemble cases 37 with
the old substantive due process education cases of Pierce v. Society
of Sisters38 and Meyer v. Nebraska, 9 which he had previously rationalized as protecting rights peripheral to the first amendment, 0 Justhat various constitutional "guarantees create
tice Douglas concluded
4
zones of privacy." '

32. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (No. 64-496). The due process privacy theory was discussed briefly. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, 12-13, Transcript of Oral Argument following recess at
23.
33. Transcript of Oral Argument following recess at 21, Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 64-496).
34. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
35. 381 U.S. at 483. In an early draft of the Griswold opinion, Justice Douglas
relied almost exclusively on a first amendment right of association theory even though
he had developed the privacy rationale previously in his Poe dissent, see Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 509 (1961). Apparently, Justice Brennan convinced him to shift the focus
to the concept of privacy. See B. SCHWARTZ, THE UNPULBISHED OPINIONS OF THE
WARREN COURT 227-39 (1985). Criticizing Justice Douglas' right of association rationale in conference, Justice Black noted that the "[r]ight of association is for me right
of assembly and right of husband and wife to assemble in bed is a new right of
assembly to me." Id. at 237.
36. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). There, the Court held that the first amendment right of
association protected the Alabama NAACP against forced disclosure of their membership list to the state. Id.
37. Justice Douglas also cited Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957);
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
38. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
39. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
40. The cases were originally decided under the rubric of the substantive due
process right to contract as part of the Lochner v. New York line of precedent. 198
U.S. 45 (1905). In Griswold, Justice Douglas reinterpreted these cases to hold that
'the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the
spectrum of available knowledge." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
Appellants relied on Meyer and Pierce in their brief and in oral argument. However,
they did not draw the first amendment principle out of them as did Justice Douglas.
Brief of Appellants at 16-17, 22, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 64496); Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 64-496).
41. 381 U.S. at 484.
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Justice Douglas then noted how the concept of privacy was
implied in the third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments, 42 quoting
language from the famous old fourth and fifth amendment case of
Boyd v. United States43 and the much more recent fourth amendment case of Mapp v. Ohio,44 which referred to "the privacies of life"
and "the right to privacy" respectively. Justice Douglas was thus able
to establish that some sort of "right of privacy" had been recognized
as a constitutional concept in a variety of contexts. He also used
these rights of privacy to establish, at least to some extent, that the
Court had recognized "peripheral rights" (or zones, emanations or
penumbras) which reached beyond the core of the explicit rights for
the purpose of providing some degree of strategic protection. 45 Citing
a series of other cases decided pursuant to the first amendment, the
fourth amendment and the equal protection clause, 46 Justice Douglas
declared that "[t]hese cases bear witness that the right of privacy
which presses for recognition here is a legitimate one."47 This declaration was primarily the point of Justice Douglas' whole line of
argument in Griswold: to show that this newly characterized right of
privacy was legitimate and that in turn the decision to invalidate
Connecticut's eccentric law was legally justifiable. 48 Justice Douglas
closed his opinion noting that the relationship at issue (marriage)
lay within a "zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees" and that the right to privacy at issue was older
than the Bill of Rights, as well as the political parties and the school
49
systems.
As was immediately apparent, Justice Douglas was preoccupied
in Griswold with avoiding the vigorous charges by Justices Black and
Stewart in dissent that the Court's decision was ultimately based on
the same sort of illegitimate substantive due process principles50 that
had been at the core of the infamous line of cases identified with

42. Id. at 484-85.
43. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
44. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
45. 381 U.S. at 485.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Sutherland, Privacy in Connecticut, 64 MICH. L. REV. 283, 288 (1965)
[hereinafter Sutherland]; Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 YALE
L.J. 453, 541-42 (1989) [hereinafter Ackerman].
49. 381 U.S. at 486.
50. Early in his opinion Justice Douglas noted that, despite some suggestions
during oral argument, Lochner was not implicated in the case. Griswold, 381 U.S. at
482 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). Justices Black and Stewart both
charged that the Court was reviving the vices of Lochner's widely condemned imposition of judicial value preferences pursuant to due process. Id. at 515-17, 522-24, 529.
The subject had been raised during oral orgument in Griswold. The Court asked Thomas Emerson, counsel for appellant whether he was asking it to follow Lochner. He
replied no, that he was asking it to follow Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(No. 64-496).
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Lochner v. New York. 51 The discovery of and reliance on a constitutional right of privacy was a means of avoiding substantive due process while at the same time attempting to provide a textual basis for
the Court's decision.
However, Justice Black was not fooled, and in his dissent stated:
The Court talks about a constitutional "right of privacy" as though
there is some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law
ever to be passed which might abridge the "privacy" of individuals.
But there is not. There are, of course, guarantees in certain specific
constitutional provisions which are designed in part to protect privacy
at certain times and places with respect to certain activities ...
One of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a constitutional guaranteed right is to substitute for the crucial word or
words of a constitutional guarantee another word or words more or
less flexible and more or less restricted in meaning. This fact is well
illustrated by the use of the term "right of privacy" as a comprehensive substitute for the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against
"unreasonable searches and seizures." "Privacy" is a broad, abstract
and ambiguous concept which can easily be shrunken in meaning
but which can also, on the other hand, easily be interpreted as a
constitutional ban against many things other than searches and
seizures. . . . For these reasons I get nowhere in this case by talk
about a constitutional "right of privacy" as an emanation from one
or more constitutional provisions. I like my privacy as well as the
next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government
has a right to invade
it unless prohibited by some specific constitu52
tional provision.
In spite of all that has been written about Griswold and its right
of privacy analysis over the past twenty-five years, no one has revealed
the difficulties with its approach more clearly and more articulately
than Justice Black did in his dissent. 53 Justice Douglas was surely
correct in noting that various constitutional guarantees are surrounded by strategic penumbras. While his language may be slightly
exotic, the idea is scarcely radical. Likewise, the notion that some of
these penumbras protect some form of privacy to some extent is a
point that even Justice Black was prepared to concede. 54 However, as
both Justice Black and later Judge Bork5 5 pointed out, Justice Douglas took a significant and untenable leap when he asserted that these
various penumbras could somehow be combined into an independent
free standing right of privacy capable of extending its protection

51.
favorable
culties of
52.
53.
54.
55.

198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Ackerman, supra note 48, at 536-45 for a recent
analysis of Justice Douglas' use of privacy as a means of avoiding the diffiLochner.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 508-10 (1965).
Id. at 507-27.
Id. at 508-10.
Id.; Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 16, at 9. See also Kauper, supra

note 8, at 257.
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beyond the sum of its parts. At that point, as Justice Black recognized, the facade collapsed revealing that the Court was engaging in
a freewheeling value-oriented style of "interpretation" that was no
easier to justify than was Lochner.56
It is likely that Justice Douglas turned to the concept of privacy
not simply as a means of legitimizing his decision but also because of
its rhetorical power.5 7 Again as Justice Black recognized, the concept
of privacy seems like a good thing which ideally should be protected
to some degree.58 However undefined the right of privacy may be, it
is hard to stand against it without seeming mean-spirited and unenlightened. Justice Douglas understood this well as he literally rhapsodized about the revered status of the right to privacy in our society.
Since Griswold, privacy as a meaningful constitutional concept
has amounted to very little. However, privacy as a rhetorical weapon
has been used to the utmost by the courts, advocates, and commentators.6 9 From a straight doctrinal standpoint, it is impossible to
discern exactly what the right to privacy protects or how the Connecticut law interfered with it. At one point, Justice Douglas expressed
concern over the degree to which privacy of the home would be
invaded by a search for "tell-tale signs" of contraceptive 6° usage. Any
such threat seems almost ludicrous in light of the record before the
Court, the history of non-enforcement and the likely uprising that
would occur in Connecticut if the police suddenly began breaking
down bedroom doors in search of contraceptives.6 '
In his concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg agreed that a right
to marital privacy was indeed basic and fundamental. 62 It would
appear that by the concept of marital privacy Justice Goldberg
probably meant the right to make certain types of intimate decisions
within a marriage such as whether to use contraceptives or take the
risk of becoming pregnant. Unlike Justice Douglas, Justice Goldberg
did not need to rely on privacy as a means of avoiding substantive
due process since like Justices White and Harlan he was prepared to
argue that due process "liberty" could legitimately be the source of
substantive constitutional rights. 6 3 Justice White was prepared to go
even further and rely directly on due process liberty without any
64
reliance on the intermediate concept of privacy.
56. 381 U.S. at 510-24 (citing Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45).
57. See Dixon, Charter, supra note 8, at 199.
58. 381 U.S. at 509-10.
59. See infra notes 246, 268, 282 and accompanying text.
60. 381 U.S. at 485-86.
61. See Testimony of Judge Robert Bork in Hearings before the Committee on the
Judiciary of the United States Senate on the Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Sept. 16, 1987, at 241-42
[hereinafter Bork Hearings].
62. 381 U.S. at 486, 495.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 502-03.
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In his lengthy dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman66 which he
66
essentially incorporated by reference into his Griswold concurrence,
Justice Harlan relied on the concept of marital privacy and privacy
in the home. He clearly thought of privacy not as an independent
constitutional right but rather as a specific and important manifestation of due process liberty.67 In his much briefer opinion in Griswold,
Justice Harlan wrote of due process liberty without mentioning
privacy.
From a doctrinal standpoint the legal concept of privacy has not
played a significant role in the series of "privacy-oriented" cases that
have followed in the wake of Griswold. In the contraceptive distribution case of Eisenstadt v. Baird,8 decided on equal protection grounds
in 1972, Justice Brennan seized the opportunity in his plurality opinion to extend the right of privacy from the marital couple to the
individual, but having done so, he declined to explain what he meant
by privacy in the context of that case. 69 Likewise, the following year
in Roe v. Wade, 0 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, seemed
to use the right of privacy as something of a constitutional peg to
hang the Court's decision on without any explanation of what the
concept of privacy meant with respect to abortion regulation. Initially
Justice Blackmun stated that there is a constitutional right of privacy "that . . . has some extension to activities relating marriage ...
procreation . . .contraception .. .family relationships .. .and child
rearing."" Without any attempt to discern what that relationship was,
Justice Blackmun then concluded that the right, whether found in
due process as the Supreme Court believed or the ninth amendment
as the lower court had suggested, was "broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."7 2 To
the Court in Roe, privacy apparently meant the right to make certain types of intimate decisions such as whether to have an abortion.
As Justice Rehnquist pointed out in dissent, the majority left its concept of privacy largely undefined, although it was obviously using the
word as a specialized term of art rather than in its more familiar
sense.7 3 However, it certainly did not appear that the concept of privacy played any significant role in the analysis or resolution of the
case.
In Whalen v. Roe,74 a case raising a more traditional privacy issue,
the Court noted that its privacy decisions actually consisted of
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961).
381 U.S. at 499.
367 U.S. at 543, 549-50.
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Id. at 453.
410 U.S. 113 (1972).
Id. at 152 (citations omitted).
Id. at 153.
Id. at 171-72.
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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separate lines of cases protecting confidentiality in information and5
independence with respect to certain types of decisions, as in Roe.1
Building on language in earlier cases, Maher v. Roe76 focused the
analysis in the abortion funding area on whether the laws "unduly
burden the right to seek an abortion.""7 While this seems to represent a major shift away from the stricter standards of Roe, the Court
introduced this change without discussing the concept of privacy at
all. Indeed, in Harris v. McCrae,78 the subsequent abortion funding
case involving the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, Justice
Stewart, writing for the Court, seemed to go out of his way to characterize the right involved in Roe as one of due process "liberty" as
opposed to privacy.7 9
In the course of invalidating several significant restrictions on
the right to abortion in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health,80 the Court defined the Roe right of privacy as protecting
8
"freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life." '
The Court was forced to lift this definition out of Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion in Roe rather than Justice Blackmun's opinion for
the Court. Justice O'Connor wrote a lengthy dissent arguing that the
"unduly burdensome" approach of the abortion funding cases should
the meanapply in all abortion regulation cases without addressing
82
ing or utility of the constitutional right of privacy.
In the highly controversial case of Bowers v. Hardwick,13 the
Supreme Court refused to recognize a broad right of privacy that
would invalidate the enforcement of a Georgia anti-sodomy law against
a homosexual plaintiff.8 4 Rather than aggregate all of the various

constitutional strands of privacy into a coherent whole as Justice
Douglas seemingly attempted to do in Griswold, Justice White divided
the privacy cases into particularized themes enabling him to characterize the issue as "whether there is a fundamental right of homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy." 5 The Court had no
interest in developing privacy as an analytical tool, perhaps because
to do so would make it easier to reach the result favored by the
dissenters.

75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 598-99.
432 U.S. 464 (1977).
Id. at 473-74 (citation
448 U.S. 297 (1980).

omitted).

79. Id. at 313-15.
80. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
81. Id. at 427 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973)).
82. Id. at 452-53.
83. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 190. See Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy N.Y.U. L. REV. 800 (1986) for a vigorous criticism of Justice White's opinion in
Bowers as well as a detailed analysis of Griswold.
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The challenge raised in Bowers v. Hardwick86 had been anticipated by virtually all of the Justices who wrote in Griswold. In his
seminal dissent in Poe v. Ullman,8 Justice Harlan explicitly stated
that, unlike marital intimacy which the state has traditionally "fostered and protected," "adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest"
would not be protected by the right of privacy since the state has
traditionally forbidden them altogether. 8 In his concurrence in Griswold, Justice Goldberg quoted this very language from Justice Harlan's Poe opinion with approval,8 9 and the working premise of Justice
White's concurring opinion in Griswold was that the anti-contraceptive
ban was unjustified since that state could prohibit illicit non-marital
sexual activity directly.90 Although Justice Douglas did not address
the prohibition of homosexual activity directly, the sanctity of marriage was the very foundation of his opinion. 9 Thus, whatever the
Griswold majority meant by the right of privacy that it crafted, it
was quite clear that it did not intend for it to extend protection to
traditionally forbidden homosexual conduct. Somewhat surprisingly,
neither Justice White's opinion for the majority nor the concurring
opinions of Justices Burger or Powell noted this point.92
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun presented perhaps the most
comprehensive synthesis and explanation of the constitutional right3
to autonomy-based privacy yet offered in a Supreme Court opinion.
Initially, he noted that the case at hand raised issues pertaining to
both privacy in decision-making and privacy of place.9 4 Relying on
earlier precedents, Justice Blackmun explained that the "decisional"
autonomy privacy cases were based on the recognition of the importance of allowing individuals to define their own identity, often
through intimate associations with others, and in ways that may be
offensive to majoritarian sensibilities. 95 Given that Hardwick was
arrested in his home, Justice Blackmun was able to build on the
place-oriented privacy cases as well, which really derive more from
fourth amendment jurisprudence than from Griswold.9 6 While Justice
Blackmun demonstrated how many of the privacy precedents can at
least arguably be woven into a coherent legal concept (though not
necessarily the one understood by the court in Griswold), Justice
White demonstrated just as forcefully that at the moment, a majority
of the Court has no intention of doing so.
86. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
87. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
88. Id. at 553.
89. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. at 553).
90. Id. at 505.
91. Id. at 486.
92. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986).
93. Id. at 199. See R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 119-26 (1989) [hereinafter R. BORK] for a strong criticism of Justice Blackmun's opinion in Hardwick.
94. 478 U.S. at 203-04.
95. Id. at 205-06.
96. Id. at 206-08.
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Finally, in the recent case of Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 7 Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality of the Court, spoke
of Griswold and the right of privacy only in response to a claim by
the dissent that it was ignoring them.9 8 Even then, Justice Rehnquist
explained that Griswold was not really pertinent since unlike Roe, it
did not create a complex analytical framework based on medical
trimesters.9 9 In his dissent, Justice Blackmun seemed eager to argue
that Roe had properly concluded that Griswold's "right of privacy"
"extends to matters of childbearing and family life, including abortion." 100 Considering that Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor were unwilling to join issue with him on these points, he responded instead to
Justice Rehnquist's assertion that the trimester analysis of Roe was
unwarranted. 10' Justice O'Connor concurring and Justice Stevens in
dissent argued about Griswold but focused on its holding with respect
to state regulation of contraception rather than as the source of a
constitutional right of privacy. 02
Although Griswold v. Connecticut0 3 is perhaps best remembered
for having given official birth to the constitutional right of privacy,
that part of its legacy has had little actual impact. As a legal concept or as an analytical tool, privacy has contributed almost nothing.
The Court has never adequately explained what it means by the
constitutional right of privacy. In the typical abortion or contraception case which we have come to think of as raising privacy issues,
the Court tends to spend as little time as possible talking about the
"right of privacy." Arguably, this is because some Justices (such as
Stewart, White and Rehnquist) never believed that talking in terms
of privacy advanced analysis and that it would be more intellectually
honest to simply approach
these questions as specialized instances of
' °4
due process "liberty.
The Ninth Amendment
Griswold is also remembered for Justice Goldberg's attempt to
revive the "forgotten Ninth Amendment."0 5 Justice Douglas had mentioned the ninth amendment in passing as he attempted to catalogue
those constitutional provisions which to some extent protected a right
of privacy. 0 8 Inspired perhaps to some extent by a recent provoca97. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
98. Id. at 3072.
99. Id. at 3058.
100. Id. at 3072.
101. Id. at 3056-57.
102. Compare id. at 3059 (O'Connor, J., concurring) with id. at 3079 (Stevens J.,
dissenting).
103. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
104. See Hafen, supra note 10, at 517-27.
105. 381 U.S. at 486-87. As Justice Goldberg noted, "[tihis Amendment has been
referred to as The Forgotten Ninth Amendment,' in a book with that title by Bennett
B. Patterson." Id. at 491 n.6.
106. 381 U.S. at 481.
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tive article by Professor Redlich,' 0 Justice Goldberg wrote a special
concurrence simply to emphasize the role of the ninth amendment.1 08
He was careful to note that he did not claim that the ninth amendment could serve as an independent source of unenumerated constitutional rights.' 0 9 Rather, it was an important reminder that the
framers recognized that such fundamental rights did exist and could
be grounded in due process liberty."'0
Both Justice Black and Justice Stewart took sharp issue with
Justice Goldberg's reliance on the ninth amendment."' They argued
that the ninth amendment was intended to protect the people against
federal encroachment on retained rights and not to provide the federal government, through the courts, a method of invalidating state
legislation." 2 As Justice Stewart noted, Justice Goldberg was "turn[ing]
somersaults with history" and the partial incorporation of the Bill of
Rights did not change that."' 3
Griswold helped to reawaken the academic debate over the
meaning and utility of the ninth amendment. Today the debate rages
on, as some commentators suggest that the ninth amendment was
better left forgotten while others call for a vigorous revival." 4 However, as far as the Supreme Court is concerned, it would appear that
Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold was the ever-so-brief high
water mark of modern ninth amendment jurisprudence. The Court
has made no significant use of the ninth amendment since that time
nor is there any reason to believe that it will in the foreseeable

107. Redlich, Are there "Certain Rights ... Retained by the People?", 37 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 787 (1962). Professor Redlich discussed the issues raised by Poe in his article.
Id. at 796-98.
108. 381 U.S. at 486. Both Professor Harper in his Jurisdictional Statement and
Professor Emerson and Ms. Roraback in their Brief for Appellant placed some reliance
on the ninth amendment and cited the Redlich article. Jurisdictional Statement of
Appellant at 15-17, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 64-496); Brief
for Appellant at 82-83, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 64-496). During oral argument, Professor Emerson explained to the Court that "the Ninth Amendment wasn't clearly raised below . . . and in that sense we didn't feel that we could
pitch it squarely on the Ninth Amendment. But we refer to that as a basis for the
right to privacy." Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Griswold v. Conhecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (No. 64-496).
109. 381 U.S. at 492.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 517-19 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 529-30 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 529.
114. Compare Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1980);
Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REV. 223 (1983)
with J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 34-38 (1980); Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth
Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1989); Barnett, Two Conceptions of the Ninth
Amendment, 12 HARV. J. LAW & PUB. POLICY 29 (1989). See generally Symposium,
Interpreting the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI[-]KENT L. REV. 37 (1988).
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future. 115 There is little, if any, support for the proposition that the
ninth amendment vests the federal courts with authority to "create"
new constitutional rights and to the extent that courts may be
inclined to purport to "recognize" unenumerated "retained" rights, they
will most likely do so under the rubric of due process liberty, as in
fact the Court did in Griswold. The ninth amendment adds only the
slightest additional support.11 6
Substantive Due Process and the Legitimacy of Unenumerated Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence
As Justices Harlan," 7 Black," 8 and Stewart ' 9 noted in their opinions, Justice Douglas' creative analysis and Justice Goldberg's reliance
on the ninth amendment seemed motivated to a large degree by a
desire to distance themselves from the negative connotations associated with the substantive due process analysis of Lochner v. New
York.' 20 In the wake of the repudiation of Lochner, judicial enforcement of substantive (as opposed to procedural aspects of) liberty
against the states had become closely associated with the illegitimate
imposition of judicial value preferences.' 2' In spite of the attempts by
Justices Douglas and Goldberg to avoid reliance on substantive due
process-or perhaps because those attempts were considered unconvincing-Griswold was a crucial step in its resurrection as a viable
legal concept. Four years earlier in Poe v. Ullman, 22 Justice Harlan
had staked out a strong defense of substantive due process liberty as
legitimate analysis. As for Griswold, Justices Harlan, White, and for
the most part Goldberg, were prepared to rely on substantive due
process liberty as their source of constitutional authority. 23 By the
time of Roe v. Wade 24 in 1972, a seven member majority of the Court
seemed unembarrassed to explicitly base its decision on "liberty."' 25
Indeed, even Justice Stewart, who had criticized the due process
analysis in his Griswold dissent, wrote a concurrence in Roe accept26
ing its legitimacy.

115. The Court cited the ninth amendment in passing in Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579 n.16 (1980), while arguing that the public possesses
an unenumerated right to attend criminal trials supplementary to the first amendment.
116. See Kauper, supra note 8, at 254 (ninth amendment theory was only an
"ornament").
117. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965).
118. Id. at 510-26.
119. Id. at 528.
120. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
121. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). See also McCloskey,
Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, .1962
SuP. CT. REV. 34.
122. 367 U.S. 497, 549-55 (1961).
123. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring);
id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring), id. at 502 (White, J., concurring).
124. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
125. Id. at 153.
126. Id. at 167.
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Griswold certainly did not start the debate on the legitimacy of
judicial recognition of unenumerated fundamental rights. In the
somewhat different context of incorporation of the Bill of Rights
against the states, the question of whether the Court could identify
and apply rights that were not specifically set forth in the Constitution had raged for decades with perhaps its most notable expression
coming in the famous case of Adamson v. California.2 7 With respect
to substantive rights, in no series of cases has the issue been presented more clearly than in the "privacy" cases commencing with Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe and extending through Griswold to Roe and Bowers.
Ultimately, the issue is whether the Court should interpret the
Constitution to protect fundamental rights or values which have little, if any, textual, historical, or structural support. Perhaps no Justice has ever addressed the matter more forthrightly than did Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman.2 8 There the
Court avoided considering on the merits the same "silly" Connecticut
law that it ultimately invalidated in Griswold.2 9 The opinion is especially powerful coming as it does from one of the Court's most articulate champions of judicial restraint. 30 As noted above, if there was
a fundamental constitutional right which invalidated the Connecticut
statute, Justice Harlan would identify it as an aspect of due process
liberty. Justice Harlan attempted to meet the fundamental rights
challenge head-on, conceding that the Court was required to "supply
• . . content to this constitutional concept,"' 3' but at the same time,
he set out to prove that in doing so judges are not "free to roam
where unguided speculation might take them.' 31 2 Essentially in
response to Justice Black's more textually oriented approach, Justice
Harlan argued that due process liberty "is not a series of isolated
points pricked out in terms of . . . specific enumerated guarantees
but is rather . . . a rational continuum which, broadly speaking,

includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and
purposeless restraints." 3 3 Justice Harlan argued that in confronting
the dimensions of due process "liberty," the judge will be constrained
not simply by whatever textual limitations exist, but by our history
and traditions as well. 34 He made the same point, more briefly, in
his concurring opinion in Griswold.35 In the remainder of his opin-

127. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
128. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961).
129. Id. at 497. The Court declined to hear the challenge on the merits in Poe
for lack of justiciability. Id. at 508.
130. Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REV. 219, 234

(1965).
131. 367 U.S. at 542.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 543.
134. Id. at 542-43.
135. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499-501 (1965).
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ion in Poe, Justice Harlan attempted to demonstrate that a "liberty"
right to privacy protecting a married couple's decision to use contra136
ceptives lies within the core of our historical tradition.
Although the fundamental rights issue was central to the decision in Griswold, none of the justices confronted it as honestly as
did Harlan in Poe. Nevertheless, Justice Harlan's Poe analysis exerted
a presence in the Griswold case. He essentially incorporated it by
reference into his short concurring opinion. 13 7 In his Griswold concurrence, Justice Goldberg quoted from and relied upon Justice Harlan's Poe analysis. 38 A great deal of Justice Black's dissent in Griswold was as much directed at Justice Harlan's analysis in Poe as at
anything in the Griswold majority or concurring opinions. 39 Although
the Griswold opinions do not reflect the degree of explicit concern
with the issues of interpretational propriety and restraint that Justice Harlan emphasized in Poe, they do evince the need to bolster
their legitimacy by making some type of textual connection. 40 Griswold also states or assumes the legitimacy of reliance on factors such
as tradition and history.
Cases such as Griswold, Roe, and Hardwick have played a large
role in igniting the predominant contemporary debate among constitutional theorists over the legitimacy of the Court's fundamental rights
jurisprudence. Griswold itself may not have seemed deeply controversial in that it only invalidated an essentially unenforced and
unenforceable law. What was there to be so upset about? Roe touched
off a controversy with respect to fundamental rights jurisprudence
because the underlying issue-abortion-was so politically and emotionally divisive, and because the Court's attempt at justification was
so cavalier and unpersuasive.' 4 ' Bowers also fueled the controversy in
that it seemed, at least to some in the academic community, to be a
42
step backward from where the Court had been headed.
Since Griswold, the Court has tended simply to decide the cases
as they have come along, without agonizing over or attempting to

136. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 552-55 (1961).
137. 381 U.S. at 500.
138. Id. at 495-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 510 n.2.
140. See Sutherland, supra note 48.
141. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 93, at 112 ("in the entire opinion there is not
one line of explanation, not one sentence that qualifies as legal argument"); Tushnet,
Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,
96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 821 (1983) ("We might think of Justice Blackmun's opinion in
Roe as an innovation akin to Joyce's or Mailer's. It is the totally unreasoned judicial
opinion ..
"); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wo. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE

L.J. 920, 935-36 (1973).
142. See Maltz, The Court, the Academy and the Constitution: A Comment on
Bowers v. Hardwick and Its Critics, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REV. 59, 60 n.4 (1989) (extensive
list of largely critical articles about Bowers).
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justify its fundamental rights jurisprudence. 43 Indeed, in Webster,
Justice Blackmun chided the plurality in his dissent for failing to
"mention, much less join, the true jurisprudential debate underlying
this case: whether the Constitution includes an 'unenumerated' general right to privacy as recognized in cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe. ... N44
The commentators have scarcely been so reticent. The fundamental rights jurisprudence of Griswold and Roe has resulted in a
truly massive outpouring of scholarship and argument. 45 To be sure,
other lines of fundamental rights precedent including school desegregation, reapportionment, and criminal process rights have contributed
to the controversy. 46 However, no area of the law fueled the fire to
the degree that the privacy cases did since it was in those cases
that the question of constitutional legitimacy was posed so starkly.
Generally, the initial academic response to Griswold and its right
to privacy was positive, 147 although some commentators could not
resist taking potshots at the rather unusual opinion of Justice Douglas.1 48 In what still may be the most significant theoretical attack on
Griswold, then-Professor Bork contested its legitimacy in a now
renowned article in the Indiana Law Journal in 1971.149 Roe v. Wade
launched a new wave of criticism aimed chiefly at the Court's fundamental rights methodology. The classic challenge came in John Hart
Ely's 1973 Yale Law Journal article, The Wages of Crying Wol" A
Comment on Roe v. Wade."10 Many other noted academics, including
Archibald Cox,15 ' Richard Epstein,"' John Noonan1 s3 and Guido
Calabesi"54 attacked Roe. Others such as Richard Posner' 55 and Louis
Henkin "1 6 critiqued the constitutional right of privacy, while still others,

143. See Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in Constitutional Adjudication: An Assessment and a Different Perspective, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93 (1984).
144. Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3044-45 (1989).
145. See infra notes 159-196.
146. Professor Wechsler's classic article Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 9 (1959), was to a large extent a response to the
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education. Alexander Bickel's classic The Least
Dangerous Branch (1962) which delved deeply into the proper role of the Court as
constitutional interpretor also predated Griswold.
147. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 130 (Professor Emerson argued and won the
case); Sutherland, supra note 48, at 124.
148. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
149. See Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 16, at 7-11. Judge Poser also critized the case vigorously. See Posner, supra note 10, at 190-96.
150. Ely, supra note 141.
151. A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 113-14 (1976).
152. Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases,
1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159 (1973).
153. Noonan, The Root and Branch of Roe v. Wade, 63 NEB. L. REV. 668 (1984).
154. G. CALABESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND THE LAW 95-97 (1985).
155. See Posner, supra note 10.
156. See Henkin, supra note 10.
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including Henry Monaghan, 117 William Van Alstyne, 158 Lino Graglia 1 9
and Raoul Berger, 60 objected to some or all of the Court's fundamental rights jurisprudence at a more general level.' Some like Judge
Bork 16 2 and Raoul Berger 63 attempted to avoid many of the problems of fundamental4 rights adjudication by developing a jurisprudence
6
of original intent.
Not surprisingly, many rose in defense of Griswold, Roe, the right
to privacy, and fundamental rights adjudication. A few, such as
Heyman and Barzely, 6 5 sought to defend Roe on its own terms. Others,
like Donald Regan, 66 Laurence Tribe 167 and Catherine MacKinnon, 68
157. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981); Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 117 (1978).
158. Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributions of
Special Theories of Judicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209 (1984); Van Alstyne,
Notes on a Bicentennial Constitution: Part II, Antinomial Choices and the Role of the
Supreme Court, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1281 (1987).
159. Graglia, "Constitutional Theory": The Attempted Justification of the Supreme
Court's Liberal Political Program, 66 TEX. L. REV. 789 (1987); Graglia, Constitutional
Mysticism: The Aspirational Defense of Judicial Review (Book Review), 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1331 (1985).
160. Berger, New Theories of "Interpretation":The Activist Flight from the Constitution, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1986).
161. See Grano, Judicial Review and a Written Constitution in a Democratic
Society, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1981); Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEX. L.
REV. 1361 (1979).
162. See R. BORK, supra note 93 at 143-87; Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note
16; Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEXAS L.J. 383 (1985); Bork, The
Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695.
163.

R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Berger, Originalist Theories

of Constutional Interpretation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 350 (1988); Berger, "Original
Intention" in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 296 (1986).
164. For a discussion of original intent methodology, see, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980); Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of "This Constitution," 72
IOWA L. REV. 1177 (1987); Dworkin, The Forum Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469
(1981); Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in ConstitutionalAdjudication: Three
Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 226 (1988); Maltz, Forward: The Appeal
of Originalism, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 1 (1988); Maltz, The Failure of Attacks on Constitutional Originalism, 4 CONST. COMM. 43 (1987); Maltz, Some New Thoughts on An
Old Problem-The Role of the Intent of the Framers in Constitutional Theory, 63 B.U.L.
REV. 811 (1983); Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987); Powell,
The Original Understandingof Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985); Nelson,
History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237 (1986);
Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the Framers, and the Role of the Ratifiers, 41
VAND. L. REV. 507 (1988); Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution:
Can OriginalistInterpretation be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1482 (1985).
165. Barzelay & Heymann, The Forest through the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its
Critics, 53 B.U.L. REV. 765 (1973).
166. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1659 (1979).
167. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1340-60 (1988) [hereinafter L.
TRIBE]; Tribe, Foreward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Law and
Life, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973).
168. MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade: A Study in Male Ideology in ABORTION: MORAL
AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 45 (J. Garfield & P. Hennesey ed. 1984). See also Law,
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984).
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attempted to justify the constitutionalization of the abortion decision
on alternative grounds.'6 9 Still others attempted to explain and defend
the fundamental rights jurisprudence of which Roe was an important
part. Though he disapproved of Roe vigorously, John Hart Ely
attempted to save most of the remainder of fundamental rights jurisprudence through a process-oriented theory in his important book
Democracy and Distrust.'70 With somewhat different emphasis, Harry
Wellington 17 and Owen Fiss 172 argued that the common-law oriented
adjudicatory approach of the courts justified value-oriented fundamental rights jurisprudence. Thomas Grey suggested that "noninterpretavist" fundamental rights jurisprudence was a legitimate successor to an earlier acceptance of natural law. 17 3 David Richards claimed
that it was appropriate for the courts to derive fundamental rights
174
while Michael
from principles of moral and political philosophy,
act as a moral
should
Court
Perry argued that in this area the
prophet. 75 Laurence Tribe 76 and Paul Brest 77 asserted that it was
proper and indeed inevitable that the Court must make hard and
controversial substantive value choices which may be guided-but are
in no sense dictated-by the Constitution.
In Democracy and Distrust, Ely provided a classic critique and
rejection of several of these alternative sources of constitutional values,
including judges' personal preferences, natural law, neutral principles,
reason, tradition, consensus, and predicting progress. 78 Ely's critics
responded in turn. 79 The general debate on unenumerated rights rages

169. Chemerinsky, Rationalizing the Abortion Debate: Legal Rhetoric and the
Abortion Controversy, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 107 (1982); Perry, Abortion, the Public
Morals and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23
UCLA L. REV. 689 (1976); Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited, 71 Nw. U.L.
REV. 417 (1976).
170. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) [hereinafter J. ELY].
171. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards, 83
YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
172. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
173. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975);
Grey, The Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American
Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1980). See also Sherry, The Founder's
Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987).
174. See D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986); Bennett, The
Mission of Moral Reasoning in Constitutional Law, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 647 (1985).
175. See M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(1982).
176. L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 1-20 (1985).
177. Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradiction of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981) [hereinafter Brest,
Fundamental Rights].
178. J. ELY, supra note 170, at 43-72.
179. See, e.g., Berger, Ely's Theory of Judicial Review, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 87 (1981);
Brest, Fundamental Rights, supra note 177, at 1090-96; Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981); Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory and Its
Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistenceof Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980); Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of
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on as each new book or article joins issue with that which has come
before.180 Indeed, the Senate hearings on the nomination of Robert
Bork to the Supreme Court, discussed in detail below, provided a
peculiarly public forum for an elaboration of the unenumerated fundamental rights debate.'
Griswold was a major judicial milestone in the fundamental rights
debate. It demonstrated that in the proper case the Court was prepared to venture beyond a strict interpretation of text, and protect
what it considered to be fundamental constitutionally secured rights
against infringement by the state. However, at the same time, most
of the justices who joined the majority opinion seemed to be sensitive to the troublesome implications of an unbounded fundamental
rights jurisprudence. Consequently, they strained to show that there
was at least some textual connection underlying their holding as well
as other real constraints on their interpretative freedom such as
Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J.
1037 (1980).
180. See, e.g., E. CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1987); R.
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); S.
LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988); M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); Ackerman, supra note 48; Alexander, Painting Without 7he Numbers: Noninterpretive Judicial Review, 8 U. DAYTON

L. REV. 447 (1983); Ball, Don't Die Don Quixote: A Response and Alternative to
Tushnet, Bobbitt, and the Revised Texas Version of Constitutional Law, 59 TEX. L.
REV. 787 (1981); Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445
(1984); Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 603 (1985); Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables,93 YALE L.J. 455 (1984); Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary Defense of an
Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821 (1985); Dworkin, Law as Interpretation,60 TEX.
L. REV. 527 (1982); Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 982 (1978); Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1984); Hafen, supra note 10; Lupu, supra note 10; Lupu, Constitutional Theory and
the Search for a Workable Premise, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 579 (1983); Maltz, Murder
in the Cathedral-The Supreme Court as Moral Prophet, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 623
(1983); Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Moore, A Natural Law
Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985); Perry, The Authority of Text,
Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 551 (1985); Richards, Interpretation and Historiography, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 489
(1985); Sager, Rights Skepticism and Process-Based Responses, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 417
(1981); Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation,79 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (1981); Saphire,
Enough About Originalism, 15 N. KY. L. REV. 513 (1988); Saphire, Constiutional
Theory in Perspective: A Response to Professor Van Alstyne, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1435
(1984); Saphire, Making Non-Interpretavism Respectable: Michael J. Perry's Contributions to Constitutional Theory, 81 MICH. L. REV. 782 (1983); Saphire, Judicial Review
in the Name of the Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 745 (1983); Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in Constitutional Adjudication: An Assessment and a Different Perspective, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93 (1984); Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its
Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
603 (1985); Tushnet, Legal Realism, Structural Review, and Prophecy, 8 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 809 (1983).
181. See infra notes 213-301 and accompanying text. See also R. BORK, supra
note 93, at 187-235 (critique of many of the theorists cited in the text and footnotes
above).
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tradition, history, or even the nebulous concept of privacy. 82 Even
so, Justices Douglas, Goldberg, and Harlan demonstrated a willingness
to be creative and take risks in the interpretative enterprise when
confronted with an unusual and challenging case. This in itself has
served as an inspiration to those who favor a bold judiciary.
Finally, it must be acknowledged that the Griswold Court was by
no means able to find a universally acceptable means of providing
adequate judicial protection for unenumerated rights, and at the same
time demonstrate that it is interpreting rather than conceiving. Others
have shown that tradition and history may provide little actual constraint, since it is often difficult to discover our relevant traditions
with any confidence. 183 Judges may not be professionally equipped to
identify the relevant aspects of our history and traditions. They also
may discover that we are heir to inconsistent competing traditions
with little to guide alternative choices. 8 4 Moreover, the level of generality at which a tradition is stated can often be outcome determinative. 185 Even if the proper tradition can be identified, there is

reason to question whether historically grounded practice (which by
definition is likely to be majoritarian in nature) will be capable of

protecting fundamental rights against majoritarian infringement in a
modern and dynamic world, absent an interpretation of the underlying tradition. 88 To be successful, reliance on tradition and history as
sources of fundamental values would almost inevitably depend upon
interpretation by judges with the intellect, wisdom, and sense of self87
restraint of a Justice Harlan.
182. See Sutherland, supra note 48, at 288.
183. See J. ELY, supra note 170, at 60-63. But see L. TRIBE, supra note 167, at
1427-28.
184. J. ELY, supra note 170, at 62; R. BORK, supra note 93, at 119.
185. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1427-28 (1988); Brest, Fundamental Rights, supra note 177, at 1084-85; Dworkin, The Forum Principle, 56 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 469, 488-97 (1981); Nagel, Forgetting the Constitution, 6 CONST. COMM. 289,
290-91 (1989) [hereinafter Nagel].
186. J. ELY, supra note 170, at 62.
187. See Lupu, supra note 10, at 1032-50 (argument that the Court should only
recognize unenumerated fundamental rights which are supported by our traditions as
well as contemporary consensus). In the recent case of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S.
Ct. 2333 (1989), a plurality, a concurrence and a dissent became involved in a quarrel
over the application of "tradition" analysis in determining whether substantive or procedural due process recognized a putative father's liberty interest in establishing visitation rights with his daughter who was living with her mother and her mother's husband and who had been born during that marriage. Justices Scalia and Rehnquist
argued that the Court should examine the tradition in issue at the greatest level of
specificity where there is evidence that such a tradition has been protected or denied.
Id. at n.6. They denied that such an approach was inconsistent with Griswold. Id.
Justice Brennan, writing for two other justices in dissent, argued that tradition should
be described and examined at a greater level of generality. Id. at 2349-59. Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, indicated that she would not foreclose the possibility of analyzing tradition at a greater level of generality. Id. at 2346-47. Both Justices Brennan and O'Connor suggested that Justice Scalia's approach was inconsistent
with Griswold. Id. at 2349-63. A plurality of the Court refused to find a liberty interest on the bizarre facts of the case.
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Ultimately, it is necessary to decide whether tradition and history constitute a legitimate source of unenumerated fundamental constitutional rights. In resolving that issue the interpreter will almost
inevitably be influenced by his conception of the Constitution and its
role in society, his confidence in or skepticism of judicial review, and
his assessment of existing precedent and practice. If history and
tradition may serve as guideposts for discerning unenumerated fundamental rights, courts may be inclined to adopt other non-textual
sources as well, including contemporary societal consensus, or evolving principles of public morality. Whether this is a "slippery slope" to
be feared or welcomed is a matter of intense debate.
Griswold as a Contraception Rights Precedent
At a less theoretical and more doctrinal level, Griswold ultimately
became a precedent providing relatively broad protection for individual decisions pertaining to matters of contraception and family
planning. Certainly in a more extreme context, the Court's protection
of the ability to (as opposed to the choice whether to) procreate
extends back to the equal protection sterilization case of Skinner v.
Oklahoma.l 8s Skinner was itself one of the building blocks for Griswold's penumbra analysis.'8 9 However, Justice Douglas' opinion in
Griswold itself scarcely developed the theme of contraception as a
protected choice, emphasizing instead privacy and marital intimacy.
The notion that constitutional protection extends to matters pertaining to contraception was drawn out to a much greater degree by
Justice White, who subjected the Connecticut statute to a rigorous
means-ends analysis in an attempt to demonstrate that it was not
closely tailored to serve any compelling state interest. 190
The recognition that Griswold created a right to make decisions
pertaining to contraception was bolstered-although in a somewhat
9
' Relying on equal protection
indirect way-in Eisenstadt v. Baird.1
conviction
under a Massachusetts92
analysis, the Court reversed a
statute for distribution of a contraceptive to an unmarried person.
After concluding that the statute was not intended to deter illicit

188.

316 U.S. 535 (1942).

189. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
190. Id. at 502-07. During the oral argument, counsel for the state was pressed
hard by the Court to explain what the purpose of the Connecticut statute was. He
was unable to offer a coherent explanation and at one point seemed to suggest that
it was justified as a matter of "pure power." Transcript of Oral Argument following
recess at 1-4, Griswold v. Connecticut.
191. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). During the oral argument in Griswold, the Court
repeatedly asked Professor Emerson whether he had an equal protection challenge to
the statute. He responded that it had not been raised below. Transcript of Oral
Argument at 2, 5 & 7, Griswold v. Connecticut. Justice Brennan, who wrote the plurality opinion in Eisenstadt was most interested in an equal protection approach in
Griswold. Emerson, supra note 147, at 220-21.
192. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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sexual relations 19 3 or to promote public health, 194 the Court held that
Griswold precluded the state from prohibiting the distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried individuals simply for the purpose of
discouraging contraception.195 Veering from the Griswold emphasis on
marital intimacy, which seemed to have played a major role in all
the justices' analyses in that case, Justice Brennan wrote that, "If the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intruaffecting a person as the decision
sion into matters so fundamentally ' 96
whether to bear or beget a child.'
Ultimately, that statement would essentially prevail as the principle of Griswold with respect to contraception. In Eisenstadt itself,
however, Justice Brennan, in the very next sentence, concluded that
the statute would violate the equal protection clause independent of
Griswold, since the distinction between married and unmarried with
respect to access to contraceptives was simply irrational. 9 As such,
the interpretation of Griswold was arguably dictum. Justices White
and Blackmun concurred in the result but not the opinion, 9 8 because
of the reliance on Griswold. Thus Justice Brennan was writing for
only a four justice plurality in Eisenstadt.99
The following year in Roe v. Wade,200 the Court hardly made any
use of Griswold as a case protecting contraceptive choice, although
it easily could have. Indeed, in Roe's catalogue of interests protected
by the constitutional right to privacy, it cited Skinner for procrea20 1
tion and Eisenstadt for contraception, with no mention of Griswold.
Finally, four years later in Carey v. Population Services,20 2 with a
working majority behind his opinion, Justice Brennan returned to
Griswold and explained that it must be read in conjunction with
Eisenstadt, Roe, and Whalen v. Roe.20 3 Put in that perspective, "Gris-

193. Id. at 448.
194. Id. at 450-52.
195. Id. at 452-54.
196. Id. at 453. The Eisenstadt Court may have been deliberately attempting to
pave the way for Roe which had already been argued before the Eisenstadt opinion
was published. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES
21 (1979).

197. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972).
198. Id. at 460-65.
199. Id. at 438-61.
200. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
201. Id. at 152. During the oral argument in Griswold itself, however, the Court
anticipated the potential application of appellant's theory to abortion. The Court specifically asked Professor Emerson whether his theory would not invalidate state regulation of abortion. He replied that it would not since, unlike the contraception deci-

sion at issue in Griswold, abortion is less likely to take place within the sanctity of
the home, and a life in being apart from the married couple is affected. Transcript of
Oral Argument following recess, at 23-24, Griswold v. Connecticut.
202. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
203. Id. at 687.
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wold may no longer be read as holding only that a State may not
prohibit a married couple's use of contraceptives. Read in the light
of its progeny, the teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified
intrusion by the State. '20 4 Thus, after a long and somewhat tortured
journey, Griswold came to stand-in doctrine as well as in fact-for
a relatively broad principle of constitutionally protected autonomy
with respect to contraceptive and procreative matters.
The significance of Griswold as a contraception rights case was
discussed in some detail by Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion
in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.205 He argued that the
preamble of the Missouri statute 206 which stated that the legislature
207
had found that "the life of each human being begins at conception"
and that "unborn children have protectable interests in life, health
and well being"208 violated Griswold's principle of contraceptive autonomy by apparently prohibiting "post-conception" contraception. 20 9 In
her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor responded by noting that
such a construction might well violate Griswold.210 However, the state
had made no effort to give the preamble such211 an interpretation, or
to give it any legally enforceable effect at all.
Conceivably, much of the same form of protection for contraceptive decisions may have developed even without Griswold, perhaps
through equal protection, as in Eisenstadt. However, Griswold has
proven to be the key decision with respect to contraceptive autonomy.
This in itself is a significant aspect of its legacy.
The Rejection of Judge Bork and the Public Conception of the Right
of Privacy
Arguably, Griswold's most significant legacy is its contribution to
the defeat of the nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme
Court of the United States. 21 2 It is difficult to determine exactly how
large a role Judge Bork's criticism of Griswold played in his defeat,
but there can be little question that it was a very significant factor.
Judge Bork's trouble began in 1971 when he published the text of a
speech he had delivered at the University of Indiana Law School in

204.
205.

Id.
109 S. Ct. 3040, 3081-82 (1989).

206. Mo. REv.

STAT.

§

1.205.1(1)-(2) (Vernon 1985).

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. 109 S. Ct. at 3082. Justice Stevens argued that the state could only have
had an illicit sectarian justification for a distinction between pre and post-conception
contraception. Id.
210. Id. at 3059.
211. Id.
212. As one of Judge Bork's supporters, this author does not consider this to be
a positive aspect of its legacy. See E. BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE (1989) for a
detailed study of the Bork nomination battle.
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the Indiana Law Journal under the title Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems.2 1 3 The article was an explanation of Professor Bork's conception of the role of the Supreme Court in our
democratic system of government. Judge Bork argued that ours is a
Madisonian system in which we are generally governed by majoritarian decision-making, except to the extent that "enduring principles"
of constitutional law as applied by the courts remove certain subjects from the democratic process. 214 However, the Madisonian system
requires that the courts override democratic decision-making only if
they are in fact applying "neutral principles of constitutional law," as
opposed to their own value choices or philosophy.215 Judge Bork criticized Judge Skelley Wright's defense of Warren Court activism2 1 6 on
the ground that it tended to justify a style of free-wheeling constitu21 7
tional interpretation that he considered unprincipled and illegitimate.
Bork examined three legal issues to illustrate his point: the Supreme
Court's decision in Griswold; its evolving equal protection doctrine;
and its first amendment doctrine in the area of seditious speech. 21 8
He asserted that
[T]he choice of "fundamental values" by the Court cannot be justified. Where constitutional materials do not clearly specify the value
to be preferred, there is no principled way to prefer any claimed
human value to any other. The judge must stick close to the text
and the9 history, and their fair implications, and not construct new
21
rights.

Bork then argued that the decision in Griswold violated this
principle in that it inexplicably concluded that the various penumbral "zones of privacy" could be combined to create an independent
right of privacy, which the Court wholly failed to define. 220 He maintained that the Constitution simply did not mark off the domain of
marital intimacy secured in Griswold as specially protected. 22 ' This
led him to ask rhetorically, "Why is sexual gratification more worthy
than moral gratification? Why is sexual gratification nobler than
' 222
economic gratification?"
He noted that a colleague derisively accused him of adopting an
"equal gratification clause"-a charge to which he pled guilty without
embarrassment. 223 A few years prior to the Indiana article, Judge Bork

213. See Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 16.
214. Id. at 2-3.
215. Id. at 3.
216. See Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court,
84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971).
217. Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 16, at 4-5.

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

7-35.
8.
8-9.
9-10.
10.
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had actually published an article in Fortune magazine22 4 endorsing

Griswold and its reasoning. 22 5 However, as he explained in the Senate
hearings, his colleague, the late Professor Alexander Bickel, persuaded
him that the decision could not be justified by legitimate methods of
constitutional analysis and thus he reversed his position. 226
During the early-to-mid-eighties when Judge Bork wrote and spoke
frequently against the excesses of judicial activism, he often used
Griswold as a case in point, repeating his earlier criticisms. 227 While
sitting on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, Judge Bork had the opportunity to return to the subject
of Griswold and the right to privacy in the case of Dronenberg v.
Zech.228 Rejecting a challenge by an admitted homosexual to his discharge from the navy, Judge Bork traced the development of the
right of privacy from Griswold on. 22 9 In his discussion of Griswold,
he repeated in somewhat milder terms his earlier criticism that a
right of privacy independent of the various penumbral zones was difficult to justify, and that the privacy right identified in Griswold was
quite undefined. 23 0 In a footnote, Judge Bork acknowledged that he
had "when in academic life, expressed the view that no court should
create new constitutional rights . . . [but since] [tihe Supreme Court
has decided that it may create new constitutional rights . . . we are
bound absolutely by that determination." 231 After analyzing the entire
line of privacy cases. Judge Bork concluded that they did not recognize a principle which would protect homosexual conduct nor did
they suggest that the majority was precluded from basing legislation
on its choice of moral values. 232 Judge Bork's opinion provoked an
impassioned response from several other judges on the court, in dis233
sent from a denial of a rehearing en banc.
When President Reagan nominated Judge Bork to a seat on the
Supreme Court two years later, an extensive debate took place before
the Senate Judiciary Committee on Judge Bork's judicial philosophy,
culminating in the rejection of his nomination. Although every aspect

224. Bork, The Supreme Court Needs a New Philosophy, FORTUNE, Dec. 1968, at
170.
225. Id.
226. Bork Hearings, supra note 61, at 117 (testimony of Judge Bork).
227. See Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,Bork Hearings, supra
note 61, at 6216.
228. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
229. 741 F.2d at 1391-98.
230. Id. at 1391-92.
231. Id. at 1396 n.5.
232. Id. at 1397-98.
233. In a dissent joined by Judges Wald, Mikva and Edwards, Judge Robinson
scolded Judge Bork for attempting to engage in "a general spring cleaning of constitutional law." 746 F.2d at 1580. Judge Bork responded in an opinion in which he
declared that "It]he judicial hierarchy is not, as the dissent seems to suppose, properly modeled on the military hierarchy in which orders are not only carried out but
accepted without any expression of doubt." Id. at 1583.
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of Judge Bork's writings and philosophy were probed, no issue was
discussed at such length and by as many witnesses as Judge Bork's
views on the Griswold case and the constitutional right of privacy.
As Senator Spector aptly put it, "Griswold is the most discussed case
in America today. 2 34 Early in his own testimony, Judge Bork restated
and defended his dual critique of Griswold from the Indiana
article-that there was no basis for deriving an independent constitutional right of privacy, and that the concept of privacy identified
in Griswold had no discernible meaning or boundaries. 235 Consequently
he argued that the Court has been unable to apply the privacy principle in a consistent and neutral manner.236 Addressing the approaches
of the various opinions in Griswold, Judge Bork contended that Justice Douglas' reliance on penumbras was "less analysis than
metaphor,"237 Justice Goldberg's discussion of the ninth amendment
was unhelpful because no one really knew what the ninth amendment was intended to mean,238 and that Justice Harlan's reliance on
239
substantive due process revived the vices of the Lochner era.
During the four days in which Judge Bork testified before the
Senate Committee, he was questioned extensively about his views on
Griswold, the right to privacy, and unenumerated fundamental rights
jurisprudence. At one point referring to the prior hearings on his
nominations as Solicitor General and Circuit Court Judge, he commented that "I have 'leen confirmed twice and I have had to eat
that [Indiana] article twice page by page. '240 Judge Bork was chal'241
lenged for adopting too narrow a view of constitutional "liberty.
He replied that a jurisprudence which permits the judge to construe
concepts such as liberty more broadly on a selective basis inevitably
242
rests on the judge's personal hierarchy of values.
Griswold was a useful case for Judge Bork's critics in that, from
a factual standpoint, the holding was obviously consistent with popular opinion. Few would approve of a law which prohibited the use of
contraceptives by married couples. Like Justice Stewart in his Griswold dissent, Judge Bork expressed his strong disagreement with the
policy of the law. 243 Because of his vigorous criticism of the legal
rationale of Griswold, Judge Bork was forced to respond to a parade

234. Bork Hearings, supra note 61, at 3789 (comment of Sen. Spector).
235. Bork Hearings,supra note 61, at 116-21, 182-84 (testimony of Judge Bork).
236. Id. at 150.
237. Id. at 290.
238. Id. at 130, 249.
239. Id. at 315, 717-18. Judge Bork has continued his vigorous criticism of Griswold since the rejection of his nomination. See R. BORK, supra note 93, at 95-100,
256-59, 262-63.
240. Bork Hearings, supra note 61, at 269 (testimony of Judge Bork).
241. Id. at 315-16 (comment of Sen. Simon); id. at 716-17 (comment of Sen.
Spector).
242. Id. at 441, 717 (testimony of Judge Bork).
243. Id. at 184, 250, 753.
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of horribles. It was asserted that if Judge Bork was confirmed he
would not vote to invalidate laws which prohibited the use of contraceptives by married people, or which permitted the intrusive "bedroom searches" hypothesized by Justice Douglas in Griswold.244 Judge
Bork tried to explain that it was highly unlikely that any legislature
would pass such laws in this day or that any prosecutor would dare
bring such a charge. 245 Still his opponents were able to portray Judge
Bork as a serious threat to sexual and contraceptive privacy. 246 This

may have been the single most damaging blow to his nomination.
Bork tried to minimize the threat posed by his critique of Griswold
by pointing out that it was essentially a contrived test case and that
no married couples in Connecticut had ever been prosecuted under
the Act.247 An attorney for Planned Parenthood responded that birth

control clinics had been officially suppressed under the law in the
248
forties.
Faced with the charge that he would overrule Griswold if the
issue arose again, Judge Bork responded that his criticisms were
aimed at the rationales suggested by the Court and that if the case
were presented to him he would consider another rationale for invalidating the law. 249 When pressed to suggest such a rationale however,

he explained that he had not made any attempt to work through
the problem. 250 This admission allowed his critics to charge that he
was shifting his position to gain confirmation, or that he was not a
very thorough scholar if he had not considered alternative
rationales
25
for such a major decision with which he disagreed. '
Following Judge Bork's testimony before the Committee, a parade
of witnesses followed in support of and in opposition to his nomination. Judge Bork's critique of Griswold was probably discussed with
greater frequency than any other item. Some witnesses explained that
Griswold was a case that has been subjected to strong academic

244. See id. at 149 (comments of Sen. Kennedy, asking whether compulsory
abortion would be constitutional); id. at 241 (comments of Sen. Biden, suggesting that
searches and wiretapping of bedrooms would be permitted); id. at 315 (comments of
Sen. Simon asking whether the state could require the use of contraceptives).
245. Bork Hearings,supra note 61, at 151, 241, 315 (testimony of Judge Bork).

246. Id. at 1268 (testimony of Prof. Laurence Tribe); id. at 3104 (testimony of
Prof. Kathleen Sullivan); id at 4786 (statement of Richard Licht). See also, R. BORK,
supra note 93, at 291.
247. Bork Hearings, supra note 61, at 241 (testimony of Judge Bork). In that
regard, Sen. Simpson referred to Griswold as "a green eyeshade special" by which he
meant a test case. Id. at 1176-77 (comments of Sen. Simpson).
248. Bork Hearings,supra note 61, at 711 (letter from Harriet Pilpel and Catherine Roraback). See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
249. Bork Hearings, supra note 61, at 324, 753 (testimony of Judge Bork).
250. Id. at 325.
251. Id. at 2394 (testimony of Prof. Sylvia Law); id. at 2493 (testimony of Prof.
Owen Fiss); id. at 3077-78 (statement of Prof. Kathleen Sullivan).
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Former Secretary of H.U.D., Hills, compared Griswold to

Lochner. Former Attorney General Smith publicly scolded Senator
Metzenbaum for propagandizing the Griswold issue in a manner that
bordered on dishonesty.25
Many of Judge Bork's critics seemed to base their opposition to
his nomination on little more than his disagreement with cases whose
substantive result they favored, such as Griswold.255 Thus, for some,
it appeared that Griswold and its right of privacy had achieved the
status of sacred cow unchallengeable by anyone with Supreme Court
ambitions. Others, such as Professors Tribe, 256 Kay,257 and Richards25 8
met Judge Bork on the level of constitutional methodology and argued
that his interpretive approach was out of step with that consistently
applied by the Court and the academic world, and that the fundamental rights jurisprudence of Griswold was defensible and legitimate. 259 They emphasized that Griswold, at least by its own self-interpretation, was part of a line of cases such as Meyer v. Nebraska,260
Pierce v. Society of Sisters261 and Skinner v. Oklahoma262 which protected significant liberties and to which Judge Bork appeared equally
hostile. 263 Ultimately, the point of this critique was to attempt to
demonstrate that Judge Bork was outside the mainstream on matters of constitutional interpretation and thus should not be appointed
to the Court.264
252. Bork Hearings, supra note 61, at 2466 (statements of Prof. Ronald Rotunda);
id. at 6018 (letter of Prof. Frederick Schauer); id. at 4362 (statement of a committee
for a fair confirmation hearing).
253. Bork Hearings, supra note 61, at 1348 (testimony of the Hon. Carla Hills).
254. Id. at 1135-36 (testimony of the Hon. William French Smith).
255. See, e.g., id. at 1789 (statement of public citizen); id. at 399 (testimony of
Sarah Harder); id. at 4033-36 (statements of the American Civil Liberties Union); id.
at 4130 (statement of American Medical Students Ass'n); id. at 4174 (statement of
various lawyers); id. at 4271 (statement of the Children's Defense Fund); id. at 453940 (statement of Federation of Women Lawyers Judicial Screening Panel); id. at 4878
(statement of Abortion Rights Council); id. at 4945-54 (statement of the NAACP and
the People for the American Way); id. at 5565 (statement of Dean M. Kelly, National
Council of Churches of Christ); id. at 5593 (statement of Haywood Burns, Pres.,
National Lawyers Guild); id. at 6145-46 (testimony of Daniel Press on behalf of Youth
for Democratic Action).
256. Bork Hearings, supra note 61, at 1268-68, 1276-83, 1299 (testimony of Prof.
Laurence Tribe).
257. Id. at 3027-46 (testimony of Prof. Herman Kay).
258. Id. at 3050-69 (testimony of Prof. David Richards).
259. Id.
260. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
261. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
262. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
263. See Bork Hearings, supra note 61, at 3072-74 (testimony of Prof. Kathleen
Sullivan); id. at 3036 (testimony of Prof. Herma Hill Kay).
264. See Bork Hearings, supra note 61, at 1296 (testimony of Prof. Laurence
Tribe) ("Judge Bork's beliefs [are] outside the acceptable range of judicial philosophy");
id. at 5107 (Prof. Stephen Gillers) ("Judge Bork's wholesale rejection of a constitutional right to privacy .. . is beyond the pale of permissible constitutional meaning").
Id.
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Bork was criticized by many for stating that he considered Roe
an illegitimate and unconstitutional decision.2 65 It was inferred that if
appointed, he might provide the decisive vote to overrule Roe.2 66 Certainly the reversal of Roe would have a far greater immediate impact
on the public than the reversal of Griswold. However, as a practical
matter, reversal of the former would lead to the reversal of the latter (along with many other subsequent cases as well). 26 7 Judge Bork's
critics emphasized his stance on Griswold because factually, and to
some extent legally, Griswold was a far less controversial case than
Roe.268 The country was deeply polarized over moral issues raised by
abortion. There was certainly no similar dispute with respect to married couples' use of contraceptives. While Justice Douglas' opinion for
the Court had been subjected to a significant amount of academic
criticism, the decision as a whole was probably accepted as a legitimate exercise in constitutional interpretation.
That was certainly not the case with Roe v. Wade.269 The very
legitimacy of the decision had been criticized vigorously by many
prominent academics. 27 0 Laurence Tribe, one of Roe's defenders, conceded that it was exceedingly difficult to justify.27 1 In short, there
was no mainstream position on Roe. Thus, it is highly unlikely that
Judge Bork's opponents could have characterized him as such a threat
to American justice if he had limited his criticism to the significantly
more controversial Roe decision. In a very insightful letter to the
committee, Professor Frederick Schauer of the University of Michigan
School of Law, who opposed Judge Bork arguing that his views on
the first amendment were "beyond the pale," admitted that both
Griswold and Roe were "tough cases." He cautioned that "the charge
that Judge Bork is in some way radically out of step with almost all
of his academic professional peers is at the least, seriously overblown ."272

Following the hearings, the senate subcommittee on the judiciary,
by a vote of nine to five, recommended that the Senate reject the
nomination of Judge Bork to the Supreme Court.2 73 The majority
265. See, e.g., Bork Hearings, supra note 61, at 5175-76; (statement of the Nation
Institute); id. at 5270 (statement of the National Abortion Rights Action League); id.
at 584-42 (statement of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and People for the American
Way); id. at 5894-97 (statement of Fay Wattleton, President of Planned Parenthood of
America).
266. Id.
267. Bork Hearings, supra note 61, at 3104-06 (testimony of Prof. Kathleen
Sullivan).
268. Id. at 1299 (testimony of Prof. Laurence Tribe); id. at 6101 (statement of
various University of Texas law professors). See also R. BORK, supra note 93, at 291.
269. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
270. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
271. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1351 (2d ed. 1988) ("by far
the most troublesome in modern constitutional law").
272. Bork Hearings, supra note 61, at 6018 (letter from Prof. Frederic Schauer).
273. Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on the Nomination of Robert
Bork to the Supreme Court, supra note 61, at 6188 [hereinafter Report].
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issued a ninety-nine page report in support of its recommendation,
covering the entire range of objections raised against the nomination.
However, twenty pages near the beginning of the report were devoted
to a critique of Judge Bork's unwillingness to recognize unenumerated fundamental rights,274 and his views on privacy.7 5 The committee summarized Judge Bork's position that the Court lacked the
authority to recognize unenumerated fundamental rights and that the
ninth amendment did not provide authority for such an enterprise. 2 6
It relied on testimony from Professors Tribe, and Kurland, former
Secretary of Transportation Coleman, and others for the proposition
that this was an unduly narrow and historically inaccurate view of
constitutional liberty and the Court's role in defining it.2 7 The committee then quoted several Supreme Court Justices including those
who favored judicial restraint (Harlan, Black, Frankfurter, Powell and
Burger) in support of the view that substantive due process was con278
stitutionally legitimate.
The committee summarized Judge Bork's frequent attacks on the
Griswold privacy right. 279 The section of the committee report on
privacy focused almost exclusively on Griswold,2 0 arguing that even
if Judge Bork accepted Griswold as precedent, as he had indicated
in his testimony that he well might, he would be unwilling to expand
the doctrine in future cases.28' It'concluded that
Judge Bork's position on the right to privacy exposes a fundamentally inappropriate conception of what the Constitution means. Judge
Bork's failure to acknowledge the "right to be let alone" illuminates
his entire judicial philosophy. If implemented on the Supreme Court,
that philosophy would place at risk the salutary developments that
have already occurred under the aegis of that right and would
28 2
truncate its further elaboration.
Several members of the majority added their own concurring
opinions to the report. In a rather lengthy statement, Senator Leahy
placed great weight on Judge Bork's continuing criticism of Griswold
and the privacy decisions as reason for voting against the nomination. 2 3 In response to Bork's contention that judicial recognition of
unenumerated fundamental rights was an "utterly subjective enterprise," Senator Leahy responded that "the role of a Justice of the
Supreme Court in these cases is to draw lines . . .relying on a keen
intellect, a deep understanding of history, a sense of justice, and that
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id. at 6194-6207.
Id. at 6216-22.
Id. at 6195-99.
Id. at 6199-6206.
Id.
Id. at 6216-22.
See id. at 6216 & 6218 (it cited Roe only in passing).
Report, supra note 273, at 6220.
Id. at 6222.
Report, supra note 273, at 6298-6301 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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undefinable mixture of prudence and boldness we call good judgment."284 Without explicitly mentioning Griswold or the right of privacy, Senator Spector noted that he was troubled by Judge Bork's
"insistence on Madisonian majoritarianism in the absence of an explicit
constitutional right to limit legislative action. '285 He noted that the
decision was "especially hard"
but concluded that he had decided to
286
vote against Judge Bork.

The five senators in the minority filed a ninety-five page
response. 287 They attempted to refute the case against Judge Bork,
point for point, devoting nine pages to the right of privacy.288 The

minority response summarized Judge Bork's position on Griswold, the
right of privacy and fundamental rights and pointed out that Justices Stewart and Black shared that position in Griswold. The minority also pointed out that several justices including Scalia, Rehnquist,
O'Connor and White have questioned expansive application of the right
to privacy in the contexts of abortion and the criminalization of homosexual conduct. 289 Quite correctly, the Minority Report recognized that,

as Bork had explained, the crucial issue is not merely whether the
Court can recognize unenumerated rights but rather how the Court
can legitimately justify recognizing some, but not other, alleged fundamental rights.290 In other words, why is the right of privacy of
Griswold and Roe legitimate when the right of contract of Lochner
and Adkins is not? 29 1 In that regard, the Minority Report cited some

of the leading scholars who contend that the right of privacy suffers
from the same vices as Lochner.2 2 The
nomination of Judge Bork
2 93
was ultimately rejected by the Senate.
There is no way to tell exactly how much Judge Bork's persistent attacks on Griswold contributed to his rejection by the Senate;
however, it is fair to say that it was a significant factor. Griswold
was a useful case for Judge Bork's opponents because its general
right to privacy and its specific holding with respect to the use of
contraceptives by married couples could be presented to the public
at large in a comprehensible and appealing manner. The opposition
portrayed Judge Bork as a threat to privacy; he could only defend
himself by talking about confusing notions such as substantive due
process, Lochner, neutral principles, and the Madisonian model.2

94
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284. Id. at 6299.
285. Report, supra note 273, at 6306 (statement of Sen. Spector).
286. Id.
287. Report, supra note 273, at 6308-6403 (minority report).
288. Id. at 6346-55.
289. Id. at 6349-50.
290. Id. at 6350-51.
291. Id. at 6351. See also Kauper, supra note 8, at 253.
292. Report, supra note 273, at 6352.
293. Greenhouse, Bork's Nomination is Rejected, 58-42; Reagan "Saddened," N.Y.
Times, Oct. 24, 1987, at 1, col. 3.
294. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
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retrospect, it became clear that Judge Bork may have spent too much
of his career attacking the wrong case. Roe had not quite arrived
when Judge Bork leveled his initial attack on Griswold in 1971.
However, had he directed more of his criticism at Roe rather than
Griswold in the early eighties, he would have presented a smaller
target, since Roe was significantly more controversial.
That is not to say that Judge Bork was incorrect in his assessment of Griswold. A funny thing happened on the way to the SenateGriswold's status as an accepted precedent became significantly more
secure. Griswold had been subjected to some criticism from the outset.
For many, it was tolerated as a somewhat bizarre decision emblematic of Justice Douglas' eccentricities. On its facts it did little harm,
and until Roe was decided and challenged it may have seemed little
more than a law professor's dream come true. However, from 1973
on, an attack on Griswold became an attack on Roe and that was a
matter of serious concern for many people. By challenging Griswold,
Judge Bork provoked those who were committed to the defense of
constitutionalized abortion rights; yet, in the ensuing battle, Roe's
defenders could focus on Griswold. As a result, Judge Bork was not
able to fully exploit Roe's weaknesses. Opponents of Judge Bork such
as Professors Tribe, Sullivan, Richards, and Kay apparantly were successful in convincing a majority of the senate committee that it could
use allegiance to Griswold as a useful litmus test for membership in
"the mainstream" of constitutional thought. At least up to the time
of the hearing this was clearly an exaggeration, if not an outright
misrepresentation.2 96 If the Bork hearings accomplished anything
beyond the rejection of the Bork nomination itself, it was the
enshrinement of Griswold v. Connecticut296 as "a fixed star in our
constitutional" firmament,29 at least on its narrow facts. Who would
now question the case, at the risk of immediate expulsion from the
fraternity of solid mainstream constitutional thinkers?
Despite arguments to the contrary by some of Judge Bork's
opponents, 2 8 the hearings should not be interpreted as a "constitutional moment" during which the public embraced freewheeling
unenumerated fundamental rights jurisprudence.2 99 As the committee
report demonstrated, bits and pieces in support of unenumerated
295. See Nagel, supra note 169, at 290-91.
296. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
297. See West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
298. See Chemerinsky, The Constitution is not "Hard Law": the Bork Rejection
and the Future of Constitutional Jurisprudence, 6 CONST. CoMM. 29 (1989).
299. See generally Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution,
93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984) (theory that on occasion 'the people amend" the Constitution informally during "constitutional moments"-periods of general heightened awareness of constitutional matters). In discussing the rejection of the Bork nomination
itself, Professor Ackerman notes that it would be far more difficult to interpret the
Bork rejection as a public validation of all of the various legal doctrines and approaches
that Judge Bork criticiized than as a public rejection of the President's attempt to
.carry the People with him in his critique of the Warren and Burger Courts" through
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rights methodology can be found in a wide array of sources, spanning a lengthy period. As a counterpoint, however, the demise of
Lochner, the decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,300 and the uncertain
fate of the constitutional right of privacy in the area of abortion
caution that the judicial debate is far from settled. Considering that
the newest participant in the debate on the Court, Justice Kennedy,
may share many of Judge Bork's views, 30 1 it would not be surprising
to find that a present majority of the Court finds itself closer to the
position of Judge Bork than to that of his critics. 02
It is probable that a majority of the constitutional academic
community supports the type of unenumerated rights interpretation
that Judge Bork abhors. Even so, fierce divisions exist with respect
to the source of such rights and the criteria for applying them. And
there remain .strong dissenting voices. 30 3 A review of the United States
Supreme Court advance sheets along with several of the leading law
reviews over the past year as well as the next will reveal that the
culmination of the Bork hearings scarcely concluded this argument.
CONCLUSION
Twenty-five years after Professor Harper introduced us to the right
of privacy in Griswold,- its legacy is great.30 4 It created a constitutional right which has had minimal doctrinal significance, but major
rhetorical and symbolic power. It reawakened interest in the ninth
amendment, although the Court itself has declined to follow through.
It re-established substantive due process as a viable, though controversial, constitutional doctrine. It fueled the ongoing academic and
judicial debate regarding the legitimacy of recognizing unenumerated
fundamental constitutional rights. It ultimately resulted in a lengthy
and controversial line of cases protecting certain decisions pertaining
to contraceptive use and distribution and abortion rights. It contributed significantly to the Senate's rejection of the nomination of Judge
Robert Bork to the United States Supreme Court and in the process
became the "most talked about case in America."305 Who would have
beieved such a wide array of provoking social and political issues
would develop out of one man's determined challenge to Connecticut's "uncommonly silly law?"
a "transformative appointment." Ackerman, Tranformative Appointments, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1164, 1179 n.20 (1988). See G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M.
TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7 (Supp. 1989) (alternative assessments of the meaning of the Bork rejection).
300. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
301. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), Justice
Kennedy joined the plurality opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist which arguably
undermined the foundation of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Judge Bork has indicated that he would vote to overrule Roe. R. BORK, supra note 93, at 116.
302. See Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term: Foreword: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 44, 45 (1989).
303. See supra notes 146-52, 154, 156, 160 and accompanying text.
304. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
305. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.

